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Steven H. Low, Member, IEEE, Nicholas F. Maxemchuk, Fellow, IEEE, 
and Sanjoy Paul, Member, IEEE 
Abstract- Communications networks are traditionally used 
to bring information together. They can also be used to keep 
information apart in order to protect personal privacy. A cryp- 
tographic protocol specifies a process by which some information 
is transferred among some users and hidden from others. We 
show how to implement anonymous credit cards using simple 
cryptographic protocols. We pose, and solve, a collusion problem 
which determines whether it is possible for a subset of users to 
discover information that is designed to be hidden from them 
during or after execution of the anonymous credit card protocol. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N THIS paper, we describe a way to implement a credit I card system that preserves personal privacy using simple 
cryptographic building blocks. In our system, the organization 
that extends credit knows a cardholder’s identity and the store 
knows the purchases. The protocol allows each to perform its 
function without either knowing both pieces of information. 
Thus, e.g., spending habits of individuals cannot be compiled, 
as they routinely are in current systems. 
Complex communications protocols employing crypto- 
graphic building blocks are being developed not only to 
communicate, but also to protect privacy, e.g., in broadband 
networks [17], [18], in mobile networks [6], in electronic 
commerce [ 5 ] ,  [9], [13], and in health insurance systems [12]. 
We view a cryptographic protocol as a process by which 
information is transferred among some users and hidden from 
others. The collusion problem determines whether a subset 
of users can discover, through collusion, the information 
that is designed to be hidden from them during or after a 
protocol’s execution. We have introduced a formal model for 
collusion analysis, and formulated and solved the collusion 
problem [8], [lo], [ll]. The second purpose of this paper is 
to apply the results to analyze the collusion property of the 
anonymous credit card protocol. For ease of exposition, we 
only describe and analyze in detail a subpart of the protocol 
that constitutes a successful transaction. For a more complete 
protocol description, the reader can see [9]. 
Manuscript received September 14, 1993, revised October 14, 1994 and 
January 3, 1996, approved by IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING 
Editor S S Lam. 
S. H. Low is with the Department of Electncal and Electronic Engineering, 
The University of Melbourne, Australia (email: slow@ee.mu.oz.au). 
N. F. Maxemchuk is with AT&T Laboratories, Mutray Hill, NJ 07974 
USA (email: nfm@research.att.com). 
S. Paul is wifi Bell Laboratories, Lucent Technologies, Holmdel, NJ 07733 
USA (email. sanjoy@bell-labs.com). 
Publisher Item Identifier S 1063-6692(96)08934-0. 
Communication networks are traditionally used to bring 
information together. Here, we use it to keep information apart. 
In constructing the system, we trust the various parties in the 
network not to collude with one another to join the information 
that we are trying to separate. However, our trust is not always 
warranted in that, either because of human intervention or 
implementation error, parties may be compromised. The ease 
with which parties can collude is an indication of how well 
the system separates the information. 
The idea of the anonymous credit card protocol is simple. 
The credit card company knows the individual and trusts the 
individual to pay her bills. The credit card company places 
funds in an anonymous account, in a different bank, and the 
individual spends funds from this account. When an individual 
makes a purchase at a store, funds are transferred from the 
anonymous account to the store’s account. Once the store is 
convinced that it has been paid, it has no need to know the 
individual’s identity. Periodically, the bank that maintains the 
anonymous account bills the credit card company, which bills 
the individual. 
In order to make the system more difficult to break, a 
double-locked box protocol is used to transfer funds between 
accounts. The funds are transferred through an intermediary in 
such a way that neither bank knows the identity of the other, 
and only the bank that maintains an account knows the account 
that the funds are transferred into or out of. The user deposits 
a box in the source account that can only be opened by the 
intermediary. Inside this box is the name of the destination 
bank and a second box that can only be opened by that bank. 
The second box has the name of the account in that bank. 
In Section 11, we describe the double-locked box and two 
building block protocols on which the anonymous credit card 
is built. These protocols assume the existence of a point-to- 
point protocol that provides certain standard cryptographic 
functions. 
In Section 111, we present the anonymous credit card pro- 
tocol. For simplicity, we ignore many functions that a credit 
card system performs beyond extending credit and collecting 
bills. They are addressed in [9]. 
In Section IV, we briefly review the collusion model intro- 
duced in [lo] and [ll], and then apply it to the analysis of 
the anonymous credit card protocol. We draw conclusions in 
Section V. 
We close this section by remarking on the anonymous credit 
card system. The use of intermediaries to hide information is 
an application of Chaum’s idea in [3], in which an intermediary 
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RSA), or a mix of both. This paper 
cryptosystem; for a public key imp1 
A. Notation and Assumptions 
The account of a customer or store X at a bank B is denoted 
(B, , X ) .  For parties X and Y in the system, K x , ~  denotes an 
encryption key shared only between X and Y in a symmetric 
key cryptosystem. K x , ~ ( m )  denotes the encryption of a 
message m with key K x , ~ .  It can be decrypted only by X 
or Y. KX,X  denotes a key known only to X .  Throughout the 
forwards electronic mail between two communicating parties, 
and hides the sender’s identity from the receiver. There are 
two differences between the current application and the earlier 
application of intermediaries. First, the communication in the 
present system is always between two specific parties, while 
the earlier system was designed for general communications. 
The limited communications connectivity makes it reasonable 
to precalculate all of the boxes that a source may need, instead 
of using a public-key cryptosystem. Second, because the 
current system transfers funds between banks, the intermediary 
must perform the function of the Federal Reserve. The inter- 
mediary determines that the source is a valid bank, guarantees 
the fund’s transfer to the destination, and does the bookkeeping 
necessary to settle accounts. In the earlier application, the 
intermediary did not operate on the information between the 
source and destination. 
To date, most work on electronic funds transfer mechanisms 
that protect a customer’s privacy has been on digital cash 
mechanisms, e.g., [2], [4], and [16], and the references therein. 
The anonymous credit card protocol protects a cardholder’s 
privacy while providing the convenience and security of 
conventional credit cards. The ability to link purchases and 
identity in ow system may make it reasonable to increase 
personal privacy in some applications. For instance, one of 
the major problems in electronic publishing is the ability to 
copy and redistribute electronic documents. A mechanism that 
has been proposed in [ l ]  and [7] to discourage redistribution 
makes each copy of a document unique and associates the 
document with the original recipient. If illegitimate copies are 
found, the original recipient can be determined. A problem 
with this approach is that publishers assemble reading profiles 
for individuals. A commercial company may consider such 
profiles very sensitive since it may not want its competitors 
to know what its employees are reading. If the publishers 
receive payment for the document with the anonymous credit 
card, they do not know who received the document. However, 
if illegitimate copies are located a subpoena can be issued 
to require the necessary parties to join their information to 
determine who received the original. The ability to join the 
identity and purchase when illegal copies are recovered makes 
it more reasonable to keep the information separate under 
normal conditions. 
11. BUILDING BLOCKS 
Our credit card system consists of the following enti- 
ties: banks, customers, stores, and an intermediary we call 
the communication exchange. Customers maintain accounts 
with banks. Banks maintain accounts with the communica- 
tion exchange; the communication exchange also serves as 
the Federal Reserve for funds transferred among banks. In 
the following subsections, we describe two building block 
protocols on which the anonymous credit card protocol is 
based. They are used for bank-to-bank communication and 
customer-to-bank communication. 
The system can be based entirely on a symmetric key 
cryptosystem (e.g., DES) or on a public key cryptosystem (e.g., 
paper, we use the notation 
X + Y  1 
to mean that X sends Y a 
header of the message c 
will be seen, m is freque 
of two messages ml and 
We will describe a prot 
party message exchanges of the form X + Y : m. We assume 
that standard cryptographic techniques are used to guarantee 
that: 
1) only the intended receiver Y can decrypt the 
m (encrypted with key K x , ~ ) ;  
2) the receiver Y can verify m’s 
originated with X ;  
3) the sender X kno 
Given that the unde 
techniques in the literature that 
e.g., [14]). For simpli 
ons. For instance, 
order to guarantee 
the intended receiv 
characteristics, additional informatio 
source and destination of the messa 
B. Double-Locked Box 
Central to our system is a 
box. Each bank account has 
called a double 
ted double-lock 
as will be seen. 
as follows. Customer X 
B,. X then asks the CO 
[B,, KB,,B, ( X ) ]  with key Kc,,,, known only to ex. We call 
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the resultant encryption a double-locked box of the account 
and denote it by 
DLB(B, ,X)  := K,,,,,[B,,KB,,B,(X)I. 
Note that X cannot directly validate the content of 
DLB(B,, X ) .  In Section 11-C, we describe a way for 
X to perform such a validation. 
If a public key system is used, X can compute DLB( B,, X) 
without involving her bank nor cx provided that she can obtain 
the appropriate public keys securely. Then, K x , ~  in a DLB 
should be interpreted as X’s  public key. 
Double-locked box is an application of Chaum’s idea in [3] 
to hide a sender’s identity from any receiver whom the sender 
knows and wishes to communicate with. Here, we use it to 
allow a sender and a receiver to communicate without knowing 
each other. This is possible because a sender in our system is 
always given a precomputed box that contains the destination 
account and, hence, never needs to know the receiver in order 
to construct the box. 
C. Bank-to-Bank Communication 
In our system, a bank does not interact with another bank 
directly, but only through the communication exchange. The 
first building block protocol allows a bank B, to transfer funds 
and a message from its customer X’s account ( B , , X )  to 
another customer Y ’ s  account (B,, Y )  at another bank B,. 
After the protocol is executed, the receiving bank B, is assured 
that the transfer originated with a valid bank, but neither bank 
knows the other. 
We assume that every bank B shares a secret key K B , ~ ,  
with cz. The source account (B,, X )  has available the double- 
locked box DLB(B,,Y) of the destination account. In the 
following, m may be null, in which case only funds transfer 
occurs. 
Protocol I Bank-to-Bank[(B,, X ) ,  ( B y ,  Y ) ,  $, ml: 
1) B, encrypts DLB(B,, Y )  and m with key KB,,,, 
shared between B, and cx and sends it to cz 
2) ex finds out the source B, from the message header, 
decrypts the body with the shared key, and is assured 
that the transfer originated with B,. It decrypts the outer 
encryption in DLB( B,, Y )  to determine the destination 
bank B,. 
Besides relaying messages, ex also serves as the elec- 
tronic Federal Reserve to transfer funds between banks. 
Every bank has an account at ex; ex decrements source 
bank B, ’s account and increments destination bank 
By’s account by $. 
It encrypts m and the inner box with key KB,,,, shared 
with B,, and sends it to B,: 
Bank B, decrypts the inner box KB,,B,(Y) and can 
associate m with its intended account (By, Y). Assured by cx 
that funds has been transferred to its account, B, increments 
account ( B Y , Y )  by $. 
Even though B, does not know the source of the message, 
it is assured by ex that it originated with a valid bank. In 
addition, because of the assumptions in Section 11-A on the 
underlying protocol, cx and B, are assured that the messages 
they receive have not been altered and are not replays of 
earlier messages. The senders B, and ex are assured that 
the messages that they have transmitted have been correctly 
received.’ 
D. Customer-to-Bank Communication 
The second building block protocol allows X to send a 
message m to her account (B,, X )  from a location S ,  in a 
way such that the following hold true: 1) bank B, is assured 
that m originated with X ,  2) B, does not know where the 
message is sent from, and 3) S does not know where the 
message is sent to. This protocol is used when X sends a 
funds transfer request to her bank from a store and does not 
want either the store or her bank to know the other. 
We assume that every customer X shares a secret key 
KB,,x with her bank B,, and the location S shares a key 
with cx. 
Protocol 2 Customer-to-Bank[S, B,, X ,  ml 
1) X encrypts m with KB, ,X and gives it to (the computer 
at location) S together with DLB(B,, X ) .  S encrypts 
them with a key shared with ex and sends the ciphertext 
to ex: 
s -+ :KS,cz( DLB(B , ,X) ,  KB,,X(m) ). 
2) The communication exchange decrypts the outer encryp- 
tion in DLB(B, , X )  and sends the inner box with the 
encrypted message to B, 
The secret key KB,J assures B, that no one but X could 
have originated m. The intermediary cz hides the store and 
B, from each other. 
In addition to making purchases at a store, the customer 
can use this protocol to verify that the double-locked box 
DLB(B,, X )  constructed by B, and ex is correct. X con- 
structs a message m = {n, a} where n is a nonce and a is the 
address X wants a response sent to. X sends m to account 
(B,, X )  using the double-locked box and the customer-to- 
bank[S, B,, X, m] protocol. Bank B, is to return n to address 
a. Since the message m is encrypted with a secret key that is 
shared by B, and X the correct response can be returned 
only if DLB(B,, X )  is correct. 
‘As discussed in Section 11-A, we assume that ex acknowledges B, in 
Step 1) and B, acknowledges cz  in Step 2). If communication in Step 2) is 
unsuccessful, ex will either retry until it succeeds or inform B, of the failure 
using some other mechanism. 
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HI. ANONYMOUS CREDIT CARD PROTOCOL 
A customer C maintains accounts at two different banks B, 
and Bp. Bank B, issues the anonymous credit card and knows 
the identity of C.  Bank Bp only manages money that has been 
deposited in P’s account. Since it does not extend credit, bank 
Bp knows the customer only by the pseudonym P. When the 
accounts are set up, C places DLB(B,, P )  of the anonymous 
account (B,, P )  in her credit card account (B,, C ) ;  she also 
places DLB (B,, C )  in her anonymous account ( Bp , P )  . In the 
following, P and C both refer to the same customer. 
At the beginning of a billing period, B, transfers funds to 
the anonymous account ( B, , P )  using DLB( Bp , P )  and the 
bank-to-bank[(€?,, C), (B,, P ) ,  $11 protocol. Here, $1 is the 
amount of credit B, is willing to extend to C. 
To use these credits to make purchases at a store S, P 
requests bank Bp to transfer funds from account (B,, P )  to 
the store’s account (B,, S) at possibly another bank B,. We 
abuse notation to use S to denote both the store and the unique 
network address (of the point-of-sale terminal) from which 
P sends her request. The double-locked box DLB(B,,S) is 
available at S. The steps to make a purchase of amount $3 
are as follows. 
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At the end of the billing period, these records will be 
forwarded to (B,, C )  and then to 
bill. Other features of conventional credit cards, such as 
cancelling lost cards or abnormal spending alert, can also 
be implemented using the building blocks of Section 11. 
4) If P always deposit 
In this section, we a 
protocol in Sections I1 
e collusion property of the 
For completeness, we first 
spells out the steps involved in a successful transaction but 
only hints at how errors will be handled. For a more complete 
P uses the protocol customer-to-bank[S, Bp, P, ml 
to send a funds transfer request to account (B,,P). 
Here, m = ($3 ,  D U ( B , ,  S), K ~ , , s ( n ,  $ 3 ) )  contains 
the amount $3 and destination account (B,  S). I1 and 111. It is indeed only one of 
K B , , s ( ~ ,  $ 3 )  binds the amount to a transaction number 
which will be returned to the store S by B, as an 
acknowledgment. A. Collusion Model 
Bp deducts $3 from account (Bp, P ) and transfers this 
amount to account (B, , S) using the protocol bank-to- 
The store’s bank B, deposits the funds into account 
(B,, S) and sends an acknowledgment to the address 
description of the anony 
modifications, see [9]. 
deal with the subpart of the protocol as 
of the complete protocol. 
Collusion is carried out in an e 
five-tuple (U,, D, K ,  U,, L), wher 
’) is a finite set Of 
2, is a finite set Of 
bank[(Bp,P), (Bs,  s),  $ 3 ,  KBs,S(n, $ 3 )  1. 
S: B,  4 S K n  The store then releases the 3, is a finite set Of 
- 6 , -  \ , 
merchandise to P. 
the end of a billing period, B, compiles a bill for the 
anonymous account (B,, P )  by adding up the amount for all 
purchases in the period. B, sends it to the credit card account 
(B,) C )  using protocol bank-to-bank[(B,, P ) ,  (B,, C ) ,  $21, 
where $ 2  is the bill amount. B, bills C through the con- 
ventional billing procedure. When C pays the bill, B, places 
additional credits in ( Bp ,P )  .
Remarks: 
1) After the protocol is executed, the store S knows no 
more than before, bank B, only knows the total amount 
$2 of purchases in the billing period, bank B, knows 
the available credit $1 at the beginning of each period 
as well as the amounts $3 of individual purchases, the 
store’s bank B, only knows that the purchase amount 
has been deposited into the store’s account, and the 
communication exchange cx only knows that funds have 
been transferred among banks. 
2) The customer can generate a personalized purchase 
record at the time of purchase, encrypt it with a secret 
only to her, and send it to her anonymous 
account ( B, , P )  along with the funds transfer request. 
identity key e ;  
4) U, C U, is a set of colluders; 
5) L C U, U D U K is a set of information that determines 
Define the information set as the of every possible 
encryption and clear text combination of every piece of 
information in the system 
whether two users can collude; se 
I := K* (U, U D U K )  
where K x  denotes K’s 
U, U D U K and k ,  E K ,  then d,  
rule k- l  k = k k -  
The keys k and k- l  are identical in secret-key cryptosystems, 
but not in public-key cryptosystems. Decryption is a function 
A : 2’ 4 2’ that is defined by the cancellation rule. For 
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instance, A({IC(d)} U {IC-'}) = { d ,  IC-'}. A(A) represents 
the decryption of a set A C: I of information by the keys 
included in A such that if IC, . . ICl(d) E A(A) then IC;' 6 
The knowledge set is the combination of the messages and 
A(A). 
information 
w := 2N x 2I 
where N is the set of unique message identifiers and I is 
the information set. An element w = (w.N, w.I) of W 
represents a user's knowledge. It has two components: the 
first component w.N C: N represents all the messages the 
user has seen, and the second component w.I C I represents 
all the information the user knows. 
As colluders in U, collude by exchanging messages, their 
knowledge is modified. This evolution is modeled by a tran- 
sition system 0 = (Wlucl, C, 6). Here, a state w = (wu, U E 
U,) in Wlucl is the knowledge of all colluders. An event o = 
( s , r )  in C := U, x U, describes the transfer of the sender's 
complete knowledge w, to the receiver r to attempt to extract 
the hidden information at the receiver. The transition function 
6 describes the transformation of colluders' knowledge as a 
result of the message exchange, as elaborated next. 
It is not always possible for two users to collude. In order 
for s to send a message to r,  s must know r ,  as in the 
protocol. Sometimes, they also must share a common, unique 
piece of information pertaining to the protocol run in question. 
To motivate this requirement, consider as an example an 
intermediary cx that forwards a piece of data to its recipient 
r in order to hide the identity of its sender s from r 
1) s --f CTC: ICcx(r,ICr(d)); 
2) cx --f r: k,(d).  
In the above, s encrypts the (encrypted) data IC,(d) and the 
recipient's identity r with a key k,. that can only be decrypted 
by the intermediary ex and sends them to cx (message 1). The 
intermediary cz then forwards the encrypted data to r (message 
2), thus hiding the identity of the sender s from r.  Variants 
of this simple protocol have been the building blocks of 
large cryptographic protocols to provide privacy in broadband 
networks [17], [18], in credit card transactions [9] ,  and in 
mobile networks [6], where traffic volumes are high. After 
the above steps are carried out, CIC knows we, := ({message 
1, message 2}, {s,ex,r,IC,IC~~,IC,(d)}) and r knows w, := 
({message 2} ,  {ex,  r,  IC,, IC;', d } ) .  For r to discover s, r must 
learn the information in we,. In a large system, however, 
cx may have forwarded a large number of messages to the 
same recipient r in a short period of time and they have 
collected a large number of we, and w,, corresponding to 
different protocol runs. Moreover, the larger protocol of which 
the above is only a part can be implemented on a datagram 
network so that messages from different protocol runs may be 
interleaved at cx. Hence to combine the information in we, 
and w, of the same protocol run, cx and r must share a unique 
piece of information pertaining to that protocol run. The unique 
message that is exchanged between cx and r can be used to 
pair up we, and w, that belong to the same protocol run. 
Alternatively, two users can collude if they share a unique 
piece of data in L,  e.g., two banks may have the unique social 
security number of a customer and, hence, can combine their 
knowledge about the customer. 
Formally, for each state w = (w,,~ E U,) and event 
o = (s, r ) ,  the transition S(w, o) is defined if and only if 




w,.N n w,.N # q5 
w,.I n w,.I n L # $. 
Note that if L = U,, then since U E wu for all U,  r E 
w, .I implies Condition (3) .  Hence, the collusion prerequisites 
reduce to the special case in which collusion is allowed as 
long as the sender s knows the receiver r.  
When the current state is w = (wu, U E Uc) and a transition 
o = ( s , r )  is made, the receiver's knowledge is expanded to 
include that of the sender. The next state, w' := 6(w, o), is 
defined by 
wk = w y ,  i f y f r  
wt.N = w,.NUw,.N, w ~ . I  = A(w,.IU w,.I). 
We call an event 0 = ( s ,  r )  in C enabled in state w if the 
transition S( w, o) is defined. A path is valid if every transition 
on the path is enabled in the state from which the transition 
is made. 
We summarize our model in the following definition. The 
transition system 0 describes all the possible sequences of 
message exchanges among the colluders and how their knowl- 
edge evolves as collusion proceeds. 
Dejnition 1: Given an environment (U,, D ,  K ,  U,, L ) ,  a 
collusion system is the (unique) transition system 0 = 
(Wlucl, C, 6) defined above. 
The collusion problem is to determine if a subset of users 
can combine their information, by passing messages, and ex- 
tract the hidden information after or during a protocol's execu- 
tion. Suppose we have a collusion system 0 = ( W I 1 ,  C, 6). 
Collusion Problem: Given an initial state w(0) E Wlucl 
and a target set of unencrypted information T C U, U D U K ,  
does there exist a valid path p in 0 that starts in w(0) and 
terminates in a state w(p)  in which a colluder c E U, knows 
T ,  i.e., w,(p).I 2 T? 
We call the valid path p in the definition of the collusion 
problem a collusion path. Though the collusion problem is 
simply a reachability analysis on the state machine 0, given 
w(O), the reachable set contains up to 2~'c~(uc~-1) states. It 
is, hence, impractical to do an exhaustive search. In [ l l ] ,  we 
provide an algorithm that, for the special case where L = 4, 
determines whether a collusion path exists, and constructs one 
when it does, from just the initial state ~ ( 0 ) .  In [lo], we 
extend the algorithm to solve the general case where L can 
be arbitrary. These results, and a negative result on least cost 
collusion paths, are proved in [8]. 
For the anonymous credit card protocol, we are interested 
to see whether various parties can collude to discover both the 
identity of the customer and her purchase. For this protocol, 
we can assume L = $, i.e., two users can collude only if 
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they share a unique message that was exchanged during the 
protocol run [Condition (2)].2 
The solution for this special case is completely charac- 
terized by the following theorem from [ll]. Define F = 
(U,, E ( w ( 0 ) ) )  as a undirected graph, depending on the initial 
state w(O), that describes all the events that are initially 
enabled by Condition (2). F contains all colluders as its nodes. 
There is an edge ( U ,  w) in E ( w ( 0 ) )  if and only if U and 'U have 
exchanged a message in the protocol run. 
Theorem 1: As per [ I l l ,  Theorem 1 follows. 
1) The collusion problem has a solution if and only if there 
is a connected component F' = (V, E )  of the undirected 
graph F such that A(U,,,wu(0).I) 2 T.  
2) The collusion problem has a solution if and only if there 
is a collusion path with the simple structure 
P = ( U O , W ) ( U l , U 2 )  
where U ,  are all distinct. 
B. Anonymous Credit Card Protocol 
We have described the intermediary ex as one logical entity. 
It can be implemented as one or multiple physical entities. A 
different program instance will be invoked at the intermediary 
cx to relay each message. Regardless of whether cz is one 
centralized entity or implemented as geographically distributed 
entities, these program instances cannot share information 
that pertains to a single credit card transaction. This is be- 
cause, by assumption, the system processes a large number 
of transactions and cx has no way to tell which program 
instances correspond to different steps of the same transaction. 
Hence, we model different invocations of ex separately as 
cx1,. . . , cx4. 
We will model the protocol that consists of a sub- 
protocol to place credit of amount $1 into (B,, P), one 
to bill the credit card account (B,, C) by an amount 
$ 2 ,  and one to make a purchase of amount $ 3 .  Specif- 
ically, the following executions are modeled: bank-to- 
bank[ ( Be, C) , ( B,, P )  , $11 to place credit that involves ex1 
(messages 1 and 2), bank-to-bank[(B,, P ) ,  (B,, C), $21 to bill 
the customer that involves cz2 (messages 3 and 4), customer- 
to-bank[S, B,, P, m] to request funds to be transferred during 
a purchase that involves ex3 (messages 5 and 6), bank- 
to-bank[(B,, P ) ,  (Bs ,  s) ,  $3 ,  K g , , ~ ( n ,  $ 3 ) ]  that transfers 
funds that involves ex4 (messages 7 and S), and finally, 
the acknowledgment from B, to S (message 9). 
The environment consists of (U,, D ,  K ,  U,, +) where 
U, = {C,  P, S,  B,, Bp ,  B,, cx1, cx2, cx3, cx4) 
D = (9, n, $1, $ 2 ,  $ 3 )  
K = {KE, ,E , ,  K B ~ , B ~ ,  KB, ,B, ,  Kc,,,,, K B , , , ~ ,  
KB,,cz, KB,,cz, KS,cz ,  KBP,P, d B , , S )  
where g are the goods purchased by C. Suppose we want 
to determine whether it is possible after the protocol is 
2Alternatively, we can assume L = { n} ,  I e , two users can collude if both 
know the transaction number for the purchase Then the algorithm in [8] and 
[lo] can be applied, but the same conclusion will be reached We assume 
L = d, here for simplicity. 
TABLE I 
INITIAL STATE OF COLLUSION SYSTEM 0 
executed for any users except C and P to discover both 
the identity C of the customer and her purchase y 
U, = {S, B,, B,, B,, ~ 2 1 ,  C Z ~ ,  c ~ 3 ,  ~ 2 4 ) .  Th 
information set is T = 
We seek a collusion p 
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Fig. 1. Graph F .  Fig. 3. A minimum collusion path. 
.:::/ 
Fig. 2. A collusion path. 
breadth-first search on each connected component of F while 
attempting to construct a collusion path of the form given 
in Theorem 1. The algorithm will return a collusion path if 
and only if the collusion problem has a solution; otherwise it 
returns NIL. 
From Table I, F is as shown in Fig. 1. Two nodes are 
connected if and only if one has received a message from the 
other in the protocol phase. F is a connected graph; moreover, 
since C E WE, and g E WS, A ( U U c ~  wu(0).I)  2 T = 
{ C, g } . Hence, according to Theorem 1, the collusion problem 
has a solution. 
Application of the algorithm in [ 111 yields a collusion path 
defined by the graph shown in Fig. 2. The labels on the edges 
specify the order in which these transitions are carried out. 
Hence, the collusion path in 0 that corresponds to the given 
graph is 
( B C ,  CZl)(CZl, c22)(cz2, Bp)(Bp, cx4) 
(c54, cz3)(c23, Bs)(Bs, SI. 
In exploring a connected component of F ,  the collusion path 
produced visits every node in the connected component. It is 
minimal (i.e., if any edge is removed, it ceases to be a collusion 
path), but not minimum. Fig. 3 shows a collusion graph that 
involves the minimum number of colluders. It is much shorter 
than the collusion path produced by the algorithm. It can 
be shown however that finding a shortest collusion path is 
NP-complete [8]. 
If we restrict the set U, of colluders to, say, 
{Bc, Bp, B,, c23, c q } ,  then no collusion path exists 
according to the theorem. The same is true if Bp is excluded 
from the set of possible colluders even though Bp knows 
neither C nor g. This is because excluding Bp breaks F 
into two separate connected components, neither knows the 
entire T .  
V. CONCLUSION 
We have presented a way to implement anonymous credit 
cards with simple building blocks that use networks to separate 
information in order to protect personal privacy. We have 
shown how to formally analyze the collusion property of the 
protocol. The analysis shows, for example, that in order to 
associate the purchase with the identity of the customer, the 
anonymous bank and both intermediaries that are involved in 
the purchase and in billing must collude even though none of 
them knows the customer’s identity or purchase. 
REFERENCES 
[1] J. Brassil, S. Low, N. Maxemchuk, and L. O’Gorman, “Electronic 
marking and identification techniques to discourage document copying,” 
in Proc INFOCOM’94, 1994, pp 1278-1287 
[2] D. L. Chaum, A. Fiat, and M. Naor, “Untraceable electronic cash,” in 
Advances in Cryptology-CRYPT0 ’88. New York Springer-Verlag, 
1988, pp. 319-327. 
[3] D. L Chaum, “Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital 
pseudonyms,” Commun. ACM, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 84-88, Feb. 1981 
[4] -, “Security without identification: transaction systems to make big 
brother obsolete,” Commun ACM, vol 28, no 10, pp 1030-1044, Oct 
1985. 
[5] D. Semyon, “SNPP: A simple network payment protocol,” in Proc. 
Computer Security Applccat. C o f ,  San Antonio, TX, Nov. 1992. 
[6] F. Hannes, A. Jenchow, and A. Pfitzmann, “Mixes in mobile communi- 
cation systems: Location management with pnvacy,” in Proc. Workshop 
Informat. Hiding, May 1996. 
[7] S H. Low, A M Lapone, and N. F. Maxemchuk, “Document identi- 
fication to dscourage illicit copying,” in Proc. GLOBECOM’95, Nov. 
1995. 
[8] S. H. Low and N. F. Maxemchuk, “Collusion in cryptographic proto- 
cols,” Univ. of Melbourne, Tech. Rep., 1996. 
[9] S. H. Low, N. F. Maxemchuk, and S. Paul, “Anonymous credit cards,” 
in Proc. 2nd. ACM Con$ Computer Commun. Security, Nov. 2 4 ,  1994. 
[SO] S. H. Low and N. F. Maxemchuk, “Collusion analysis of cryptographic 
protocols,” in Proc. GLOBECOM’96, London, U K., Nov. 1996. 
816 1 
[ 1 11 ~, “Modeling cryptographic protocols and their collusion analysis,” 
in Pruc 1st Int Workshop Infovmnt Hiding, Univ of Cambridge, U K , 
May 1996 
[12] -, “The use of communications networks to increase personal 
privacy,” in Proc INFOCOM’95, 1995, pp 504-512 
[I31 G Medvinsky and B C Neuman, “Netcash a design for practical 
electronic currency on the internet,” in Pruc Ist ACM Conf Computer 
Commun Security, Nov 1993 
[14] R M Needham and M D Schroeder, “Using encryption for authen- 
tication in large networks of computers,” Commun ACM, vol 21, no 
12, pp 993-999, Dec 1978 
1151 ~, “Authentication revisited,” ACM Oper Syst Rev,  vol 21, no 
1, p 7, Jan 1987 
1161 T Okamoto and K Ohta, “Universal electronic cash,” in Advancer 
in Cryptulogy-CRYPT0 ‘91 New York Springer-Verlag, 1992, pp 
324-337 
[I71 A Pfitzmann, B Pfitzmann, and M Waidner, “ISDN 
MIXes-Untraceable communications with very small bandwidth 
overhead,” in Pruc. IFIP/Sec’91, 1991, pp 245-258. 
[ 181 A Pfitzmanii and M Waidner, “Networks without user observability,” 
Cumput Security, vol 6 ,  no 2, pp 158-166, 1987 
Steven H. Low (S’88-M’92) received the B.S. 
degree from Come11 University, Ithaca, NY, in 
1987, and the M S and Ph D degrees from Uni- 
veisity of Califomia at Berkeley, in 1989 and 1992, 
respectively, all in electrical engineering. 
He was a Consultant to NEC, San Jose, CA, 
in 1991, and was with AT&T Bell Laboratories, 
Murray Hill, NJ, from 1992 to 1996 He has held 
visiting positions at Rutgers University, NJ, and the 
University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong. 
He joined the University of Melbourne, Australia, 
as a Senior Lecturer, in May 1996 His areas of research are in the design, 
control, and optimization of communication networks and protocols He holds 
one patent 
marking 
Dr Low received the 1996 R&D 100 Award for his work on document 
EEEIACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING, VOL 4, NO 6, DECEMBER 1996 
(F‘89) received the 
City College of New 
Ph D degrees from the 
ad of the Distributed 
inent at AT&T Bell 
Laboratories, Murray Hill, NJ, where he has been 
since 1976 Prior lo joining Bell Laboratories, he 
was at the RCA David Sarnoff Research Center, 
Pnnceton, NJ, for eight yeas  He has been on the 
adjunct faculties of Columbia University and the 
University of Pennsylvania He has been an Advisor on data networking 
to the United Nations, the National Science Foundation, the Rome Air 
Development Center, Canada’s Information Technology Research Center, the 
Telecommunications Research Institute of Ontario, and other organizations He 
has served as the Editor for Data Commu ations for the IEEE TRANSACTIONS 
ON COMMUNICATIONS as a Guest Editor r the IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED 
AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, and is currently on JSAC’s Editorial Bo 
the Chairman of the Steering Committee of the IEEEiACM TRANS 
ON NETWORKING 
Dr. Maxemchuk was awarded the RCA Laboratories Outstanding 
Achievement Award in 1970, the Bell Laboratories Distinguished Technical 
Staff Award in 1984, the IEEE’s 1985 and 1987 Leonard G. Abraham Prize 
Paper Award, was made a fellow of the IEEE in 1989, and received the 1996 
R&D 100 Award for his work on document marking 
University of Pennsylvania 
2) received the B Tech (Hons ) 
ics and electrical communications 
Park, both in electrical ering, in 1988 and 
1992, respectively 
He worked as an Assistant Systems Engineer in 
India for CMC Limited from 1985 to 1986 He 
joined the Distributed Systems Research Depart- 
Wireless Networking Research Department at Bell 
